How Ceylon Torpedoed British Military Bases

Foreword

The release of some de-classified archival documents in Britain exposes us to some fascinating bits of information on the geo-politics of the mid-20th century when Britain was trying to retain parts of its once vast empire through the expansion of the old “Europeans Only” British Commonwealth. This paper deals with its relations  with Ceylon (Sri Lanka), a small but prized colony at the time. Readers may even find that, though the world has since changed much in the last half century, some old attitudes of the empire have not fully changed.

How Ceylon (Sri Lanka)Torpedoed British Military Bases.
“There are times when one tragedy, one crime tells us how a whole system works behind its democratic facade and helps us to understand how much of the world is run for the benefit of the powerful and how governments lie. To understand the catastrophe of Iraq, and all the other Iraqs along imperial history’s trail of blood and tears, one need look no further than Diego Garcia.”
John Pilger, The Guardian, 02 October, 2004

The imperial appetite for foreign bases
Do imperial powers need foreign military bases? The Foreign Affairs magazine once argued that the US really needed only re-fuelling facilities for its military when on the move and not permanent bases. If this were true, why does the US maintain 766 bases in over a 100 countries while it is now in the process of building several more in Afghanistan and Iraq,[1] together with planned missile bases in Poland and Romania? Extensive military bases are required by imperial powers not only as a stepping stone to attack other nations in the region, to intimidate potential regional rivals but also to exercise some control over the host country. Weaker nations are persuaded to allow bases either through intimidation or secret deals with government leaders or promises of financial gains through leasing fees. One of the most egregious examples in recent times was Diego Garcia, a British colony, where Imperial Britain transported the entire local Chagossian population of over 2,000 in 1971 to Mauritius a nd Seychelles, where they live in dire poverty without resources, and leased the whole island to the US for a military base[2]. While a British court finally accepted the Chagossians’ “right to return” in 2004, forty years after forcible deportation, the British Foreign Office imperiously declined to comply. Did the UN Secretary-General order an inquiry? Did the International High Court take David Milliband to task? Did international media keep highlighting this crime? Did the “International Community” condemn UK and impose sanctions? Keep asking.

Strategic importance of Ceylon
Sri Lanka escaped being host to UK military bases only because of the sagacity of its leaders in the mid-20th century. Let no one under-estimate the strategic importance of Sri Lanka which lies a thousand miles north of Diego Garcia. Diego Garcia provides a base for bombers targeting Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan but Sri Lanka, being a thousand miles closer to these theatres of war, would have reduced  costs and increased effectiveness. Bases in Sri Lanka would give the imperial powers the best location for monitoring and commanding the major sea routes in the Indian Ocean region to the Far East, the fastest growing region in the world today, abutting the big oil suppliers in the Middle East. After all, the West is committed to a never ending involvement with the Middle East and its oil.

On 05 May, 1947, prior to final agreements on Ceylon’s independence, the British Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted a cabinet paper numbered C.P (47) 147[3], stating:
“Strategic Importance of Ceylon,
2. The maintenance of the security of our sea and air communications is one of the basic requirements of Commonwealth strategy. Ceylon derives its importance from the commanding position it occupies in relation to our sea and air communications in the Indian Ocean. In any future war we should require to use Ceylon as a base from which to defend these communications.
The island forms an essential link in our cable and wireless network to Australia and the Far East. It is also the centre of our Naval Intelligence organisations for countries bordering the Indian Ocean.
3. Inability to use Ceylon would deprive us of the only existing main fleet base between Malts and Singapore and would seriously weaken our control of the Indian Ocean.….”

When the Board of Ministers in the Ceylon State Council sought independence in return for full Ceylonese support for the British in World War 2, the British made it clear that military bases, defence and foreign affairs was off the table. The British government’s declaration to the Board of Ministers in 1941 offered “full responsible government under the Crown in all matters of civil administration” in a post-war re-examination of the Ceylon Constitution in appreciation of Ceylon’s valued contribution to the war effort. But it went on to state:
“2. His Majesty’s Government will retain control of the provision, construction, maintenance, security, staffing, manning and use of such defences, equipment, establishments and communications as His Majesty’s Government may deem necessary for the Naval, Military and Air security of the Commonwealth, including that of the Island, the cost thereof being shared between the two Governments in agreed proportions.
3. Ceylon’s relations with foreign countries and with other parts of the British Commonwealth of Nations will be subject to the control and direction of His Majesty’s Government.”
Note that Ceylon was also required to make a financial contribution towards the military bases.

D.S. Senanayake (DS as he was commonly known), Leader of the House and Vice-Chairman of the Board of Ministers, who master-minded the campaign for independence, was a master diplomat. He did not have the appetite or the temperament for confrontational politics, mass protests and violence against the British like his counterparts in India and Burma which left those countries severely scarred after independence with violent internal conflicts. That was left to the communist parties in Ceylon whose capacity for mischief quickly evaporated when their leaders were arrested for sedition and jailed till the end of the war. DS knew that the question of bases was not negotiable with the British: it was too important for imperial Britain. At the same time, the presence of foreign bases would be seen as diminishing Ceylon’s independence, both at home and abroad, as it turned out eventually. DS’s strategy was to allow the bases but avoid a written treaty. It worked very well for the country in the course of time.

The British Secretary of State for the Colonies, in his Cabinet Paper (47) 4 of 29 April, 1947, sets the options available to Britain on the basis of the demands made by D.S
“10. The position as I see it may be summarised thus:-
Mr. Senanayake is faced with a general public demand that Ceylon should become “independent”. He is distrustful and afraid of India and would prefer Ceylon to an independent member of the British Commonwealth rather than be absorbed by India. ….. He is well aware of the strategic importance of Ceylon to the British Commonwealth, and is ready, in return for the grant of independence within the Commonwealth, to meet His Majesty’s Government’s essential needs in the defence sphere, as well as togive undertakings not to enter into foreign commitments which might be embarrassing to the Commonwealth as a whole.”..
12. I have given anxious  thought to this matter, more particularly in view of the accusation which hasbeen made against the present government of “scuttle” and of “squandering the Empire”[4]. It seems to me that, on the contrary, if this matter is rightly handled, we have an excellent opportunity not only of keeping Ceylon within  the British Commonwealth and of securing  our vital defence interests there, but of demonstrating to the world  that our proclaimed policy for the Colonial peoples is not an empty boast, and that independent status in the Commonwealth is not, in practice, reserved for people of European descent.”

This essentially summarised the options available to both the British Empire and to Ceylon at that juncture. In the Cabinet memorandum CM (47) of 6 May, 1947, the Colonial Secretary put forward his view again.
“In view of the recent  developments in India and Burma, Mr. Senanayake has now reopened the matter by asking that Ceylon should be promised “independence within the Commonwealth” as soon as possible after the inauguration of the new Constitution in October 1947[5]. He had undertaken that Ceylon would enter into agreement with His Majesty’s Government for safeguards in respect of Imperial Defence and external affairs, but had asked that the promise of independence should not be made conditional on those agreements.  Acceptance of this proposal would involve taking a risk on Mr. Senanayake’s good faith and his chances of being in power; but refusal would strengthen the hands of the extremists in Ceylon, who were pressing for complete independence, and might prejudice the inauguration of the new constitution.”

The defence agreements were made out as being designed to protect Ceylon as well but evidently DS had no illusions on this point (and how right he was,  in hindsight), as this note in the same Cabinet minutes indicates.
“2 (a) Mr. Senanayake had suggested that it was unrealistic to suppose that His Majesty’s Government would be willing to face a major clash with India in order to protect Ceylon’s interests. It should be made clear to him that His Majesty’s Government could not accept such an argument.”
This message, it was later agreed, should be communicated to Mr. Senanayake verbally by the Governor of Ceylon as it was too sensitive to be put on paper.A final decision on Ceylon’s independence was not taken at the meeting and the Chief of the Air Staff, in particular, still had objections, insisting that that there was no assurance that Mr. Senanayake would keep his promise.

Immediate post independence  discussions on defence agreement
In a Report on Ceylon, C.P.(48) 91, dated 17 March 1948, by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, after the  Independence celebrations in Ceylon on 04 February, 1948, the question of drawing up the defence agreement was again highlighted.
“5.  …. Our defence relations with Ceylon will depend upon mutual friendship and confidence: this cannot be written into a document and certainly cannot be forced out of Ceylon as a result of a document. On the balance, the Prime Minister (ie. DS) favours, as early talks on defence as possible. His motives are:-
(a) Doubt whether the existing Defence Agreement, which was agreed to by Ceylon before independence, may not prejudice Ceylon’s entry into the United Nations Organisation; and
(b) His desire to get a firm defence agreement that will allay his fears about excessive Indian influence in the future affairs of Ceylon.
It was not my intention to bring up this subject but it was immediately raised on their side. The chief points are:-
(a) Ceylon will insist on the formal preservation and assertion of its sovereignty and would prefer unpublished agreements and assurances to a Formal Treaty.
(b) Ceylon is keen to get an extremely close military tie up with us and will in fact give us all we want, if the forms of sovereignty are preserved.
(c) We have some bargaining to do about rent, &c., for ground we use: but I do not think they will pinch us too far.
(d) They are not prepared to spend very much themselves on their own defence: we my need to push
them in this matter. They want an independent force of their own but are thinking of a force of only 1,000 strong.

(e) They want us to train Ceylonese in our military bases and raise Ceylon units of the Imperial forces which can serve outside Ceylon. They want the Pioneer Corps in Malaya to be continued.”

Cold War games and a discordant note
The fears of the Ceylon government were not unfounded. In the UNO and the Security Council, the USSR and its allies battled with the US and its West European allies to obtain membership for their allies and block the entry of allies of the other side. As Ceylon saw it, it had become a pawn in the Cold War. Within six months, after it applied for membership of the United Nations Organisation, the Soviet Union and its satellite, Ukraine, raised objections to Ceylon’s admission because, as the Soviet representative asserted  “His government knew that Ceylon was not really independent.” This confirmed the fears by DS and forced the British government to admit that “It was this that led us to discuss the revision of the Defence Agreement between the United Kingdom and Ceylon concluded last year (Cmd. 7257). That Agreement gave the United Kingdom wide defence facilities in Ceylon, and we felt that the Soviet Union might argue that Ceylon was far from independent, since the United Kingdom had in effect the power to occupy the entire island.”[6]
Instead of a Defence Agreement, the new option was a “Defence Declaration” which was discussed with Sir Oliver Goonetilleke who was doing the lobbying for Ceylon’s admission with other countries, including the Soviet bloc.

Towards the end of 1950, there were some discordant notes about Ceylon on this issue. Britain was peeved by the fact that Ceylon made its application for UNO membership without consulting the Commonwealth Secretary. When it failed at the committee stage of the Security Council, Oliver Goonetilleke made contact with the Soviet bloc independently but realised that Ceylon’s blocked entry was tied to a similar block placed by the Western group on Outer Mongolia and Albania. When Ceylon appealed to Britain that there should be a deal between the two power blocs to allow Ceylon’s entry, it rejected this course of action after much discussion[7]. Ultimately, Ceylon gained admission to the UNO only in 1955 when the Soviet Union removed its veto.

The British Secretary of State, P.G. Gordon-Walker, at the end of a Commonwealth tour reported to the Cabinet about Ceylon, by C.P. (50) 219 of 05 October 1950, with only these very abrupt sentences.
“Ceylon
34. I need not go into details but, after talks with the Prime Minister (ie. DS)  and other Ministers, I have come to the conclusion that we must now take a frank and rather tougher line with Ceylon on economic and defence matters. Ceylon is trying to have things both ways, and to get the benefits of Commonwealth association without accepting the responsibilities.”
The British, as the former overlords, were shocked to realise that Ceylon was behaving like an independent country. They expected this from India but not from a small former colony like Ceylon which had proved to be so accommodating in the past.

The negotiations on defence
The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations reported the impasse with Ceylon on defence matters in a memorandum to the Cabinet, C (52) 287, dated 25 July 1952.

The main British military establishments in Ceylon still remaining after World War 2 were: Trincomalee harbour, dockyard and other installations; Royal Navy Camp in Diyatalawa; Airfield in Negombo (Katunayake); 3 RAF Signals Stations; Wireless station at Anderson (just north of Colombo).

The trouble was that the Defence Agreement with Ceylon of 1947, prior to full independence, was vague. It stated that the UK could base naval, air and land forces in Ceylon “as may be mutually agreed.” The British government wanted a written agreement guaranteeing security of tenure but, it reported, “there has been no progress owing to the devious tactics of the Ceylon Government.” The British Prime minister, Clement Atlee, had sent a personal letter on this subject to Prime Minister D.S. Senanayake dated 23 April, 1951, but the letter was not answered. D.S. Senanayake had passed away on 22nd March, 1952, and after the subsequent elections his son, Dudley Senanayake, was Prime Minister with a bigger majority in parliament.

There were now differences to be resolved. As an independent nation, Ceylon now claimed ownership of all land and buildings occupied by the UK forces and hence there was the issue of rent payable for these facilities. Ceylon wanted the Anderson Wireless Station moved to Trincomalee as the land close to Colombo was required for urban development. The British estimated that the cost of £2 million involved was too much to bear as it was still financially strapped with external debts. Ceylon also wanted military training equipment and a frigate for its planned navy. The UK was considering a total sum of £800,000 to meet all these costs and maintain
goodwill. No agreement was negotiated and a final decision on this was made at the British Cabinet meeting of 4 September, 1952, C.C. (52) 78.
“10. …. Agreed that there was no need to take the initiative in trying to reach a comprehensive agreement for the tenure of our bases in Ceylon, but that the offer of a frigate, which should be refitted at their expense, should be made to the Ceylon Government in order to facilitate negotiation over the replacement of the wireless station in Anderson.”

Ceylon was however inadequately equipped to handle internal violence within the country. During the so-called “hartal” organised by the communist parties in 1953, the Ceylon government, faced with a breakdown of law and order in Colombo, asked the UK whether landing parties from Royal Navy ships could be made available to aid its civil power. The British Cabinet agreed to inform Ceylon that if required, British Navy personnel could only be deployed to protect their own bases to free Ceylonese troops for internal security.

Opposition to foreign bases and the entry of SWRD
Within Ceylon there was strong opposition to the British bases by the communist parties that held that this diminished its independence. This was in stark opposition to the ultra-conservative forces within the ruling United National Party, led by the veteran Finance Minister, Oliver Goonetilleke, and the new Prime Minister, John Kotelawela, who succeeded Dudley Senanayake in October, 1953. Oliver Goonetilleke, at a meeting with the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations on 30 November, 1953, said that “the (British) Navy and Air Force should remain here for ever.” At the same meeting, Goonetilleke stated that if the new wireless station in Trincomalee was built, Britain could retain it as long as it wanted. This would be sanctioned by an exchange of letters which should not be made public, but which would be sufficient evidence of good faith, as a formal agreement was bound to cause opposition in Ceylon. On 03 December, 1953, John Kotelawela himself had a meeting with Lord Swinton, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations[8], and confirmed Oliver Goonetilleke’s position that British bases must always
remain in Ceylon.

The 1956 elections gave the ruling UNP and its leaders a resounding defeat. The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, in a memorandum to the Cabinet, C.P. (56) 107, dated 01 May, 1956, made these perceptive remarks about the defeated party which had been their closest ally in Ceylon:
“3. The result is probably a vote against the previous government than for any new policy. In some ways this is a healthy sign. The previous regime had become corrupt and autocratic; its leaders were wealthy landowners who were not averse from rigging affairs to suit their own convenience. Sir John Kotelawala, their leader, was a vain, ambitious self-advertiser, determined to “put Ceylon on the map”. In one sense it is salutary that the Ceylon public should have “seen through” Sir John Kotelawala and their vote can be regarded as a sign of intelligent democracy.”[9]
On the other hand, the new Prime Minister, S.W.R.D Bandaranaike, was held in good esteem in the same Cabinet memorandum, despite his avowed commitment to a more independent national agenda. With his background of having lived and studied in Britain, he had the charm and the manners that were appreciated and was described as showing “signs of moderation and sense of responsibility since gaining office.”

Ownership of military bases
But Britain was now faced with the problem of retaining the bases as the new Ceylon ruling party manifesto called for “an immediate withdrawal of foreign bases and foreign troops”. To meet this emergency, the British Chiefs of Staff put in their minimum essential requirement of military facilities in Ceylon:
(a) The naval base and facilities in Trincomalee, though some facilities could be cut down to reduce costs
(b) The Negombo airfield for transport to the Far East due to limited facilities allowed in India
(c) The wireless communications facilities which must be preserved.

After Mr. Bandaranaike’s discussions with the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs and the Minister of Defence, the British Cabinet memorandum, C.P. (56) 168 of 04 July, 1956, stated that he “did not wish to break ties between Ceylon and the United Kingdom or to abrogate the Defence agreement of 1947 (a document in extremely general terms, which has very limited value) and are ready to let us have the facilities we need, on the understanding that they will have been made available by Ceylon and are not held by the United Kingdom as a right.” Mr. Bandaranaike had insisted that the principle of transfer cannot be qualified when the British requested the addition of the clause “that the transfer of the Bases would be subject to terms and conditions to be mutually agreed.” Mr. Bandaranaike was given a list of facilities that the British required but he said he could not comment on these before consulting his own colleagues and experts. The memorandum noted:
“We cannot claim that the document is entirely satisfactory from our point of view. The only card we have is the threat of unemployment in Trincomalee if we close down the Base altogether, and we played it for all it is worth.” The memorandum noted that if talks were allowed to break down, Mr. Bandaranaike might “make a statement very unfavourable to us on his return to Ceylon, or even give us notice to quit”, which he had a legal right to do The British bases in Ceylon would now have to depend on the goodwill of Ceylon.

In the event, the final agreement was that the UK would transfer the Naval Base at Trincomalee and the RAF Station at Katunayake to the Government of Ceylon. The timing and the financial arrangements were to be discussed later. The Ceylon Government was willing to allow the use of these facilities by Britain on terms and condition to be agreed upon. The important confirmation of Ceylon’s sovereign authority over its land was contained in this statement attributed to Mr. Bandaranaike in the same memorandum: “He made it plain that while the local operation, management and control of the facilities made available to the United Kingdom  will be entirely a matter for the United Kingdom Government, the power of the United Kingdom local representative carrying out these functions must be understood to be derived from the general authority of the Government of Ceylon springing from the status of Ceylon as an independent sovereign state.” These terms were assented to by the British Cabinet at their meeting of 05 July, 1956, C.M. (56) 47th Conclusions.

Concluding thoughts
Despite its successful assertion of national sovereignty, Ceylon was going through a tumultuous period of political turmoil between 1956 and 1960. The Prime Minister had little control over internal conflicts in the government between right wing and left wing elements in his party and had little control over the security situation when race riots broke out in the country over the official language issue. The British Cabinet meeting of 04 June, 1958, C.C. (58) 46th Conclusion, noted:
“3. The Commonwealth Secretary said that the situation in Ceylon had deteriorated. He had felt obliged to authorise the High Commissioner in Colombo to agree, if so requested by the Ceylon Government, to their use of British aircraft for the transport of police for the maintenance of public order, but there was no question of British troops  being employed for this  purpose.”
There was a breakdown of law and order and Prime Minister Bandaranaike was himself assassinated by extremists in his own party on 26 September, 1959.

Kenneth Abeywickrama
25 June, 2011.
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allowed with the permission of the author.

[1] http://rt.com/programs/documentary/army-bases-us-war/
[2]
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/01/humanrights.usforeignpolicy
[3] Throughout this document, the prefix C.P. refers to
“Cabinet Paper” and C.M. refers to Cabinet memorandum
[4] Accusation made against the
Labour Party by the by the Conservatives, particularly Winston Churchill.
[5] This refers to the Constitution based on the Soulbury
Report.
[6] Cabinet memorandum by the Secretary of State for
Commonwealth Relations, C.P. (48) 204 of 17 August 1948.
[7] Cabinet meeting minutes (48) 76 of 25 November, 1948,
Section 3.
[8] Cabinet Memorandum C (53) 345 of 8 December, 1953.
[9] Perhaps the British government was also peeved by
Kotelawala’s continuing efforts to woo the new super-power, USA, more than the old colonial power, Britain.
D.S. Senanayake
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